- Ηaris Doukas, Professor at NTUA, Greece
- Professor Romanus Odhiambo Otieno, Vice Chancellor Meru University Of Science and Technology(MUST), Meru, Kenya
- Dr Ioannis Tsipouridis, Vis. Prof. at TUM & MUST, Kenya
In theory one would expect that ESG criteria would be the most decisive in the energy industry’s role in the transition to a global zero-carbon economy. And this is because the ESG criteria are linked at multiple levels to the energy transition required at the international and national level to effectively deal with the climate crisis. These criteria include, among other things, corporate climate policies, the carbon footprint of business operations, the utilization of renewable energy sources (RES), actions to save energy, raw materials, etc, indicators that are inextricably linked to the global effort to disconnect economic development from environmental destruction.
In practice, however, this is not the case. Far from it.
Even though the energy sector can boast of the fastest institutional and technological developments in a green direction, it comes, second to last among all sectors of the economy, just after telecommunications, in ESG evaluations (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2021).
Evaluation in the environmental dimension (“E”), which is one of the three integral axes of ESG, is often confused with the evaluation of companies in terms of their ability to generate economic value in the future. Thus, if a company maintains a high carbon footprint but this is not judged to threaten its future economic value, it may still enjoy a high ESG rating from various rating agencies. In other words, ESG investment sustainability does not exclude practices that are inconsistent (or diametrically opposed) to environmental sustainability and climate priorities.
This also explains some additional oddities observed in the energy sector in terms of ESG performance. For example, while the main effort in energy is to divest from fossil fuels, oil companies are reported to receive more favorable ESG ratings compared to companies operating purely in RES, based on some evaluation methodologies.
Such practices increase the risk of Greenwashing.
Also this practice begs the question: how can a company investing in practices conflicting head on with sustainability and climate priorities be considered as having future economic value? The certain future outcome of such investments is stranded assets. Hence how can they have high “E” score?
Moreover, the environmental dimension wrongly overshadows the other two dimensions, as far as the energy transition is concerned. A failed management of the social impacts (“S” dimension) of the green transition will not only lead to stranded assets, but it will also lead to significant social inequalities, with communities and people being “stranded”. We are experiencing such a risk today with the increase in energy costs that exacerbates the problem of energy poverty for a large portion of citizens.
If we now bring the “G” dimension (governance) into the equation, taking into account that ESG criteria must be an identity for the company and an integral element of transparent corporate governance, and not just another marketing tool, the need for open systems and governance tools that will engage Management and mobilize the entire organization to promote sustainable practices, becomes apparent.
In conclusion, by definition ESG criteria can and should have a decisive role in the energy transition. This, however, presupposes transparency of the scientific authenticity and reliability of the evaluation methodologies and systems. If the ESG criteria are not based on open systems and governance tools, supported by open scientific methodologies, that “certify” the ESG “claims” of companies or fund managers, then they will not promote sustainable practices but lead to green fraud (green washing).
The war in Ukraine, after the Russian invasion, complicated things even more as far as the already ambiguous term ESG is concerned.
Let’s take a typical example, that of the defense spending sector.
For years in Europe, many banks and investors refused to support companies active in the field of defense spending as this would be against their ESG policy. But the war in Ukraine has accelerated European rearmament policies, with voices now promoting the categorization of defense companies as “sustainable” so that ESG investors can support the defense equipment of countries facing the risk of an aggressive neighbor.
A good example in hand is Latvia’s defense minister who targeted Swedish banks and investors because they refused to issue a loan to a Latvian defense spending company due to “moral issues” questioning whether national defense development is a moral issue.
At the same time, the war exacerbated energy connected problems, since it brought about a dramatic increase in oil and fossil gas prices due to fear of interruption of the Russian energy supply.
The dilemma is clear.
Is ceasing exploration of new oil and gas projects and moving away from fossil fuels altogether in the context of clean energy still a valid ESG strategy or is security of supply changing the ESG perspective?
At the same time, the war has created yet another dilemma.
Should “responsible investors” exclude entire states (such as Russia) from their investment map?
Then, if investors, based on the term ESG, choose to isolate entire states, what will this decision mean for states with high strategic importance but controversial environmental and social status such as Saudi Arabia and China?
The intertwining and often conflicting principles and interests guiding the economy, geopolitics, environment, energy and climate change require immediately a clear global direction; otherwise there will be huge space for greenwashing.
And we don’t have the time to readjust later and we shouldn’t let dilemmas, valid as they may be, derail us from the one and only climate-compliant pathway.
We are getting close to Code Red for climate and humanity and hence delay is not an option.